Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain

[camosoul]

If there is an option to get more money you will pick that one and not development.

Unless development brings even more money... Duh. The balance point here is "Will the proposal actually do anything useful?" And that is negated by being paid no matter what.

I don't get a paycheck for quitting my job. I don't get a piece of the block reward when I shut down my MN and unplug my miner. The standing proposal fails to address welfare/pork for non-contributors taken by force with no option to vote "no."

 

[camosoul]

break the incentive to vote no out of self-interest.

There is no such incentive and the argument is empty.

There is a need to balance pork with productivity and have the option to pull the plug on non-contributory members, just like unplugged miners or MNs that don't MN.

MN operators, and everyone hodling, want the decimal point to more left. But presuming that there wil always be a worthy project is short-sighted. Evan is talking about an ecosystem that outlives him. You can't hand that ecosystem over to a know pork death already exemplified by government. We know for absolute certainty that this doesn't work, we're surrounded by it every day, and is the very driving force for why crypto came into being... So we scuttle the ship in the very thing we're trying to avoid? in 20 years, what do we need this for? Why is it still being skimmed off and handed to devs/foundation for no reason?

Entitlement brats don't ever think ahead. They just squander their welfare and party on the moon until it's gone and then they want more handed to them, oh, look, a pork barrel, lets pretend to do work so we can mooch it...

 

[camosoul]

'Is it "fair" to "tax" masternodes?' isn't my argument. All currency infrastructure providers (MNs and miners alike) are losing revenue, but it's not even that that I object to.

I object to siphoning off a large chunk of money for projects that have yet to even be proposed. I object to both/either that money being stockpiled forever, or more likely squandered on nonsense with no tangible benefit.

I would like to see a system that, if a proposal passes vote, and the costings pass vote, then the agreed amount of blockchain money is diverted for it. Keep a sensibly sized emergency warchest by all means, but cap it. The cap can always be revisited at a future date, by vote.

This way, there are still no free riders, because if 51% of MN ops vote yes, the money is deducted from all infrastructure providers, not just themselves.

Now we're getting somewhere... The entitlement brats will eventually give way to the brains... Either in conceding reality, or succumbing to it...

This conversation makes my solar panels pretty...

 

[camosoul]

All these "run a masternode for me because I'm too lazy and stupid" services; How will their non-votes be tallied?

Since all they did was throw money in a pot, do they really get to vote? Aren't the actual operators the ones providing service? Shoudn't they get the vote since they're the ones actually doing something?

 

[camosoul]

To say that 15% of each block will be diverted to a project queue, as long as such queue exists, is a much, much, much better solution. We vote on whether a thing gets added to the queue. If the queue is empty, 15% is not diverted. Simple, elegant, closed-ended by virtue of not creating an open end in the first place... Cap is instated by virtue of 15% being the maximum... Self-solving paradox, just like crypto is meant to be...

A second layer of fund-rate could be added. A project queue vote, and a vote on 1%, 5%, 10% or 15% being diverted to accomplish it. This helps with non-urgency, and in price changes. It also forces voters to put their money where their mouth is. If it's so damn important, pay up, bitch! Can't force your way into other peoples' wallets.

If 1% is elected, and an individual operator feels fit to give 15% of his piece, he may do so, but cannot force anyone else to do so.

Since miners aren't voting, their piece of the pie should not be affected. They aren't giving up a part of their lives to study the proposals and make the decisions, so they neither gain nor lose their portion of the block reward in this process. It comes solely from, or not, those actually involved; the MN operators.

Fuck, I'm awesome.

 

[sdef2]

All these "run a masternode for me because I'm too lazy and stupid" services; How will their non-votes be tallied?

Since all they did was throw money in a pot, do they really get to vote? Aren't the actual operators the ones providing service? Shoudn't they get the vote since they're the ones actually doing something?

I kinda thought of the same thing last night.
Alot of the masternode owners are using masternode services.
Will there be any method for the actual owners to vote, or is voting only possible from 'command line' on the actual masternode?
Maybe we should find a way to vote without actually having cli access to your masternode ? Somekind of webinterface might be easiest(?).

 

[sdef2]

Oh and just another thought; IF pooled trustless masternodes are introduced, how would 'shared' owners vote / how would their vote count?
Maybe something to keep in mind when developing some things.

 

[TanteStefana]

Fuck, I'm awesome.

ROFLMAO :grin::tongue::grin::tongue:

 

[Solarminer]

To say that 15% of each block will be diverted to a project queue, as long as such queue exists, is a much, much, much better solution. We vote on whether a thing gets added to the queue. If the queue is empty, 15% is not diverted. Simple, elegant, closed-ended by virtue of not creating an open end in the first place... Cap is instated by virtue of 15% being the maximum... Self-solving paradox, just like crypto is meant to be...

A second layer of fund-rate could be added. A project queue vote, and a vote on 1%, 5%, 10% or 15% being diverted to accomplish it. This helps with non-urgency, and in price changes. It also forces voters to put their money where their mouth is. If it's so damn important, pay up, bitch! Can't force your way into other peoples' wallets.

If 1% is elected, and an individual operator feels fit to give 15% of his piece, he may do so, but cannot force anyone else to do so.

Since miners aren't voting, their piece of the pie should not be affected. They aren't giving up a part of their lives to study the proposals and make the decisions, so they neither gain nor lose their portion of the block reward in this process. It comes solely from, or not, those actually involved; the MN operators.

Camosoul is putting this into perspective. Each project needs to be sold to the masternode voters. If it isn't any good it doesn't fly. If it is, it gets funded. This also opens the door for anyone to contribute - not just foundation members. It also shouldn't be a "start with x% and look at it again every 2 years if it should change". Funding should expire and need to be sold again as another project and voted on - or at least be able to get a vote no and unfund it. If we are hitting the cap vote on raising the cap, but I see no reason to wait 2 years to make a decision - that is what? 20 years in dollar terms.

I still see no reason to start with 15% take like in your first paragraph with projects rotating. This only allows one project to get completed at a time. Each project with have a length and funding that is best. Fixing bugs is an ongoing project so it would be a low reward but maybe 2 year length, where a video or wallet feature might be better as a 10% for 1 month to get it going quickly. This also opens the door for more projects, and ability to start them faster.

Interesting idea to allow different donation amounts per masternode. I don't know about this, might be better just to pay through a donation address instead and keep the voting to one % / time length.

 

[Solarminer]

Fuck, I'm awesome.

I'll agree with you on this, but just because you said solar panels in your post above. :grin:

 

[TanteStefana]

Camosoul's basic concern, that it would be very bad to have pork barrel wasted funds, or even a huge savings account building to infinity and I completely agree. I just know there are many ways to skin this cat, and that the proposal put out is vague on a lot of things on purpose. But as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe said, "less is more and god is in the details" We will be hashing out those details together here, as we have been.

The way I see it, there are several ways to do this. 1. We could make a fund, pay for basic core development and marketing, then allow people to propose projects against this fund, vote on them, and fund what we can. Then, when the funds are not used up and a basic savings amount is reached, the rest of the funds could be returned to the system. Or, 2. We could make a fund, pay for basic core development and marketing and have the community decide what essential projects we need, create a specification and send it out to bid, and pay for those projects in order of importance and then again, return unspent funds each year. Or, 3. We could somehow create a system whereby core development and marketing costs are projected for the year or so, and the funds are deducted from mining rewards with a cap of 15%, on an as need basis. A constantly adjusted fund is created for this, or perhaps it could work more like a tax (accross the board tax) If everyone is in agreement that a certain project needs to be built, then funds are allocated and the tax is raised to pay for it. until the entire 15% is spent, or anything less than that.

There are probably other ways of doing this, just trying to break it down to a sentence :tongue:

In a practical sense for simple programming, and less arguing on not wanting to spend so much (in order to keep as much for themselves), a flat 15% goes to the fund is easiest. But in the future, that could end up being billions of dollars, all caught up in a pork barrel with everyone wanting to spend them on their pet projects, and who could possibly oversee so many projects? However, this % could also be adjusted yearly by the core team based on recommendations of the community. Or it could be hard programmed in to reduce each year assuming a constant value increase in each coin.

Oh hell, i could go on and on and nobody will read because it looks like a book, LOL

 

[fernando]

There is no such incentive and the argument is empty.

There is a need to balance pork with productivity and have the option to pull the plug on non-contributory members, just like unplugged miners or MNs that don't MN.

MN operators, and everyone hodling, want the decimal point to more left. But presuming that there wil always be a worthy project is short-sighted. Evan is talking about an ecosystem that outlives him. You can't hand that ecosystem over to a know pork death already exemplified by government. We know for absolute certainty that this doesn't work, we're surrounded by it every day, and is the very driving force for why crypto came into being... So we scuttle the ship in the very thing we're trying to avoid? in 20 years, what do we need this for? Why is it still being skimmed off and handed to devs/foundation for no reason?

Entitlement brats don't ever think ahead. They just squander their welfare and party on the moon until it's gone and then they want more handed to them, oh, look, a pork barrel, lets pretend to do work so we can mooch it...

I have to disagree about the incentive. There is such an incentive. I'm not donating any part of my masternode proceeds and I know there are worthy causes for the coin. I don't donate because I feel that my very few masternodes would make little difference and I fucking like the coins I get. I feel that I have donated enough already, so I don't. I care about myself more.

I know I'm not alone in that feeling. If we are all so awesome that we only have the coin's best interest in mind, why there are so few donations? and I don't buy the "it is difficult/I don't know where or to whom" argument. I think there is widespread consensus that people like Flare or UdjinM6 deserve to get paid and their addresses are public, so anyone interested in donating can do it already. You don't even need to set up anything automatic, you can just send a payment. If we don't donate is because we are humans and we look after ourselves first. And that is ok, that is what makes humans great. Looking after ourselves first have taken us far, but we can't negate the evidence.

Btw, in the part of my message that you don't quote I was suggesting to send the coins back after some time if they were not used in deserving projects. I like base zero budgeting and I don't want stupid projects getting fund either.

 

[fernando]

I kinda thought of the same thing last night.
Alot of the masternode owners are using masternode services.
Will there be any method for the actual owners to vote, or is voting only possible from 'command line' on the actual masternode?
Maybe we should find a way to vote without actually having cli access to your masternode ? Somekind of webinterface might be easiest(?).

The voting is done in the local wallet, so those with managed masternodes still can vote by themselves.

 

[alex-ru]

I was suggesting to send the coins back after some time if they were not used in deserving projects.

Proposal:
If MN operator can't dispose of "his" developing budget by himself for 1-2 years - these funds must be automatically sent to Official Foundation multi signature address - so these funds will be used (even If it wouldn't be as effective as in case MN-operator decided by himself) to develop DASH project anyway.

 

[thelonecrouton]

I have to disagree about the incentive. There is such an incentive. I'm not donating any part of my masternode proceeds and I know there are worthy causes for the coin. I don't donate because I feel that my very few masternodes would make little difference and I fucking like the coins I get. I feel that I have donated enough already, so I don't. I care about myself more.

I know I'm not alone in that feeling. If we are all so awesome that we only have the coin's best interest in mind, why there are so few donations? and I don't buy the "it is difficult/I don't know where or to whom" argument. I think there is widespread consensus that people like Flare or UdjinM6 deserve to get paid and their addresses are public, so anyone interested in donating can do it already. You don't even need to set up anything automatic, you can just send a payment. If we don't donate is because we are humans and we look after ourselves first. And that is ok, that is what makes humans great. Looking after ourselves first have taken us far, but we can't negate the evidence.

Btw, in the part of my message that you don't quote I was suggesting to send the coins back after some time if they were not used in deserving projects. I like base zero budgeting and I don't want stupid projects getting fund either.

I'm with you on this, once that money is in my wallet you'd need a crowbar to pry it back out, but ticking a box in-wallet to allocate a portion of future block rewards to a a well thought out and presented proposal that I believe will increase the value of my DASH... is an entirely different animal.

If I like a proposal and think they can pull it off, I'll tick that box without hesitation, because I'm not spending my money, I'm voting that future block reward, which is diverted from everyone, is spent.

Two different things.

 

[alex-ru]

If I like a proposal and think they can pull it off, I'll tick that box without hesitation, because I'm not spending my money, I'm voting that future block reward, which is diverted from everyone, is spent.

It sounds like exclusion from the rule...
How much it can get? My prediction is:
5% of MN operators * 10% of their earning = 0,5% of new coins - for first "enthusiastic month"
And after 2-3 months they will see they are paying for everybody and result will become even worse, I expect
3% of MN operators * 5% of their earning = 0,15%

It is just not enough. And this is a very unfair system. We can see it with existing (Bitcoin, ...) systems - do not expect a miracle with DASH about it.

 

[thelonecrouton]

It sounds like exclusion from the rule...
How much it can get? My prediction is:
5% of MN operators * 10% of their earning = 0,5% of new coins - for first "enthusiastic month"
And after 2-3 months they will see they are paying for everybody and result will become even worse, I expect
3% of MN operators * 5% of their earning = 0,15%

It is just not enough. We can see it with existing (Bitcoin, ...) systems - do not expect a miracle with DASH.

They are not 'paying for everybody.'

If 51% of MN ops think it's a good idea, block reward from all infrastructure providers gets diverted towards the project and it gets done. If not, whoever wants to spend the money will have to do more work to persuade people to support their idea.

You can not 'see it with existing Bitcoin systems' because they don't have a proposal/voting system in place to divert future block rewards to projects that a majority/consensus deem worthy.

I agree with you one one thing though: electorate participation is likely to be relatively low as time goes on, which is exactly why 15% (or any %) should not be automatically allocated to the pot each and every block.

When you have Tungfa and Minotaur repeatedly saying, "$40000 a month is nothing!" and, "$500000 a year isn't even enough to run a small business!" you know that every available penny is going to get squandered in an orgy of cronyism without effective consensual oversight. Maybe to our resident Rothschilds these amounts barely qualify as pocket change, but to most people $40000 a month is a lot of money and how it is spent should require some goddamn effort on the part of those wishing to spend it.

 

[alex-ru]

If 51% of MN ops think it's a good idea, block reward from all infrastructure providers gets diverted towards the project and it gets done.

Your proposal is better then individual donations, but:
1. I don't think miners and investors "will be happy" about fact that MN op's can unpredictably "diverted" any amount at any time.
2. It have lots of administrative work - it is not a "stable system", it is "manual management".
3. Also it'll be hard to plan anything serious, urgent or long-term.
4. ...

But MN ops must vote for better system (as they think) before it starts. And change it later if it doesn't work as expected.
So there is no risk of making "fatal mistake" now.

 

[thelonecrouton]

Your proposal is better then individual donations, but:
1. I don't think miners and investors "will be happy" about fact that MN op's can unpredictably "diverted" any amount at any time.
2. It have lots of administrative work - it is not a "stable system", it is "manual management".
3. Also it'll be hard to plan anything serious and long-term.
4. ...

But MN ops must vote for better system (as they think) before it starts. And change it later if it works not as expected.
So there is no risk of making "fatal mistake" now.

1. They ought to be happier than, "15% is going to get spent regardless."
2. Decentralisation implies devolvememnt of responsibility. Fulfilling that responsibility needs a minute of your time now and again to cast a vote. After that the system/blockchain takes care of things.
3. No it does not. The only difference is that a project team actually has to present a credible case first to get funds allocated. As it should be. As Camosoul said, if voters don't have a real "No" they aren't going to bother at all, and as you said participation is likely to be low anyway - there are hundreds of MN ops but only a small fraction are even here to expressa any opinion at all - so under the proposal as initially presented in the OP, all sorts of worthless shit is going to get rubber stamped by the proposers themselves without any opposition.

The proposal in the OP should be changed from "Decentralised Governance By Blockchain" to "Automated Cronyism By Blockchain" because that's exactly what's going to happen if this goes ahead unmodified.

 

[alex-ru]

1. They ought to be happier than, "15% is going to get spent regardless."

Two different mental situations:

1. Predictably accumulating stable budget FOR RD&marketing from nobody (it doesn't harm anyone).
2. Unpredictably "diverting" funds FROM everybody.

Just imagine situation: 55% MN ops decide to finance "Decentrilized exchange" (or even worse - something for MNs) - unpredictably "diverting" funds FROM 100% of miner (also from dissent 45% MN ops).
It'll be hell: "They are robbing us! Why is MY money going to that f*cking exchange - I don't need it! I didn't accepted it! How can these 55% decide where my money is going!?" and so on.

OK, just IMHO.

Anyway only community can vote for best system to implement.