Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain

[Solarminer]

First donation model works like what I think you are saying - Vote no and don't pay. Vote yes and only yes' pay.

The last three are different. Even those that vote no still pay in. The vote also filters out the projects that dont have value.

With mandatory donations you vote for the best of a pool of projects and over time none of them have any value.

 

[moli]

First donation model works like what i think you are saying - Vote no and don't pay. Vote yes and only yes' pay.

The last three are different. Even those that vote no still pay in. The vote also filters out the projects that dont have value.

With mandatory donations you vote for the best of a pool of projects and over time none of them have any value.

Good to see opinions of someone with an engineering background analyzing the proposal down to details, as they say engineers like to solve problems..

 

[TanteStefana]

Solarminer, I don't understand the last sentence. "With mandatory donations you vote for the best of a pool of projects and over time none of them have any value." Could you please explain? What I don't understand is "over time, none of them have any value".

 

[Solarminer]

Solarminer, I don't understand the last sentence. "With mandatory donations you vote for the best of a pool of projects and over time none of them have any value." Could you please explain? What I don't understand is "over time, none of them have any value".

Eventually, the good features are implemented. With the same funding coming in, the later projects end up wasting money. Think 20 or 100 years from now.

 

[TanteStefana]

You return extra money to the system, and if there is no need for funding remove the DAO. That's what we pay the core developers for. Why do you insist that Masternode owners will fund projects that don't help the network?

The only problem you bring up that is valid is, is the wallet that holds these funds safe? That question has to be answered by Evan er al, because I don't know how funds can be secured from theft completely.

But Satoshi Nakamoto's 400,000+ bitcoin wallet has been sitting there many years now, and I'm sure people are trying to grab it.

 

[thelonecrouton]

How to keep funds from being wasted or over funding the system is important, but has to be dealt with after the % of funds are set aside.

I completely disagree. Mandatory taxation is theft. Whether it's daylight robbery down the barrel of a gun, at threat of being locked in a concrete box, or being told "If you don't like it you can sell your DASH and bugger off," it's theft.

Were the US founding fathers (who I'm certain had most of their good sense beaten into them by the founding mothers) not pretty clear on the evils of mandatory taxation?

I don't see this working any other way. It'll be a constant, "Why should I vote for funding this project if others aren't and get to keep all the block reward % for themselves?" Can't you all see that? That's the whole reason for this proposal!

It absolutely should be a constant case of those wishing to spend money having to justify that expenditure to the people from whom the money is coming, and only getting paid when they actually deliver results. Take a look at the world around you, the very real and very ugly consequences of mandatory taxes spent on useless and idiotic nonsense are everywhere. Kristov Atlas correctly refers to the resultant system as Proof of Violence.

If someone wants to set up a DAO to organise and fund DASH development, great, but they have no right that I recognize to turn every DASH infrastructure provider into an involuntary charity-giver.

 

[fulltimegeek]

This is creative.

So the full 15% full time block reward distribution would only happen if 100% of the masternodes voted yes. This is a way to determine the % to go to the project by how many yes votes are cast. Interesting.

What if there were two projects? Would the masternodes only get to vote for one of them? Then each project is paid by the % of masternodes that voted for it.

It is still possible to end up with underfunded projects since there isn't a threshold or focus to direct the funding. If there were 5 projects and 3 projects get 10 votes and 2 get 49% of the votes. The projects with 10 votes have donations that can't be used as it isn't enough for the projects to move forward. The other two move forward with 30 less votes of funds that they could have used. This is a much bigger problem if there are more projects.

The way masternodes are paid now is that each one gets a block reward split every 4 days or so. The way your proposal is written, if a node votes yes, it will never get paid it's 15% and nodes that vote no will never pay the 15%. This digresses back to the voluntary donation model and the masternodes might as well just pay for a project directly without voting.

This could be changed with a portion of each masternode block reward is given to the project owner based on the portion of yes votes. That way all masternodes pay for projects with the same %. The underfunded project problem still exists.

When I speak of a proposal I mean a spreadsheet with all of the projects proposed for that year. It is an all or nothing system. Either you fund all the projects in the proposal (in which the funds get broken up by the % column for each project/recipient) or not. This is so people don't have to vote on single projects but all at once. This way MN ops have a year to find and study next year's spending proposal.

Regarding the underfunding problem, I believe this can be solved with witty "yearly proposal submitters". They can easily redirect all the funds for a specific project within the proposal if they need more money else where. All this detailed and nitty-gritty work would be thought through by the proposal creators themselves. If masternode ops like how the funds are being spent, then more would vote "YES" throughout the year and the projects would get even more funding.

One more thing, I previously said that a "NO" vote would go to MNs but it might be better if it just goes into escrow for next year's proposal, and so on.

 

[thelonecrouton]

When I speak of a proposal I mean a spreadsheet with all of the projects proposed for that year. It is an all or nothing system. Either you fund all the projects in the proposal (in which the funds get broken up by the % column for each project/recipient). This is so people don't have to vote on single projects but all at once. This way MN ops have a year to find and study next year's spending proposal.

Regarding the underfunding problem, I believe this can be solved with witty "yearly proposal submitters". They can easily redirect all the funds for a specific project within the proposal if they need more money else where. All this detailed and nitty-gritty work would be thought through by the proposal creators themselves. If masternode ops like how the funds are being spent, then more would vote "YES" throughout the year and the projects would get even more funding.

One more thing, I previously said that a "NO" vote would go to MNs but it might be better if it just goes into escrow for next year's proposal, and so on.

I like the way Solarminer presented it much better. Time scales in months or years are useless, you might as well go join the Bitcoiners. :grin:

 

[thelonecrouton]

You return extra money to the system, and if there is no need for funding remove the DAO. That's what we pay the core developers for. Why do you insist that Masternode owners will fund projects that don't help the network?

The only problem you bring up that is valid is, is the wallet that holds these funds safe? That question has to be answered by Evan er al, because I don't know how funds can be secured from theft completely.

But Satoshi Nakamoto's 400,000+ bitcoin wallet has been sitting there many years now, and I'm sure people are trying to grab it.

This is a false comparison. The Great Satoshi Stash is not acting as a pork barrel that's ripe for plundering by people who have direct financial motivation to grind any opposition to their spending down, because they will get the $$$ and the opposors have already had that $$$ taken from them and are never getting it back.

One group will persevere to get the $$$, the other has little motivation to oppose as they have already been taken from.

 

[TanteStefana]

I completely disagree. Mandatory taxation is theft. Whether it's daylight robbery down the barrel of a gun, at threat of being locked in a concrete box, or being told "If you don't like it you can sell your DASH and bugger off," it's theft.

Were the US founding fathers (who I'm certain had most of their good sense beaten into them by the founding mothers) not pretty clear on the evils of mandatory taxation?



It absolutely should be a constant case of those wishing to spend money having to justify that expenditure to the people from whom the money is coming, and only getting paid when they actually deliver results. Take a look at the world around you, the very real and very ugly consequences of mandatory taxes spent on useless and idiotic nonsense are everywhere. Kristov Atlas correctly refers to the resultant system as Proof of Violence.

If someone wants to set up a DAO to organise and fund DASH development, great, but they have no right that I recognize to turn every DASH infrastructure provider into an involuntary charity-giver.

How is this different from when it was taken from the miners and given to the masternodes? Why shouldn't a third arm that provides services (development) be paid?

 

[fulltimegeek]

I like the way Solarminer presented it much better. Time scales in months or years are useless, you might as well go join the Bitcoiners. :grin:

There needs to be some sort of time commitment by the masternodes that voted YES to the spending proposal or they can easily change thier vote within 2.5 minutes after all is said and done. If I was a developer with DASH payouts as my only source of income, I would need the security of knowing that I am at least getting payments of those who initially voted "YES" for the yearly, spending proposal.

This concept would give the Masternode OPs The Power Of The Purse just like congress. Either we vote to spend on the DASH government(spending proposal) or save money into an escrow for next year's spending proposal. Saving is beneficial in multiple ways, it decreases supply and also acts as a nest egg for large-scale projects if the need arises.

Edit:

Also, since only one spending proposal can be elected via votes per year, the submitter would pretty much be the point of contact as to how things are running (if they're not anonymous). He/she would most likely be the representative/face of the DASH governance for that years time. I, as a MNO, am not going to be reading about every project in the proposal but will depend heavily on the reputation of the submitter(s) of the spending proposal(i.e. Evan Duffield).

 

[Solarminer]

The only problem you bring up that is valid is, is the wallet that holds these funds safe? That question has to be answered by Evan er al, because I don't know how funds can be secured from theft completely.

Ah, you are seeing the light. :smile:

The question of the safety of the wallet is not just a developer/technical dilemma. The crypto space has attacks from all entities. All that has to happen is 1 DASH is involved in a drug deal, terrorist activity, money laundering, or transaction that is too big, or....and the government/banking system will go after the "masterfund" that supports it all. It may not even make sense, it may not even be a legal confiscation. Why even make the target?

 

[thelonecrouton]

There needs to be some sort of time commitment by the masternodes that voted YES to the projects or they can easily change thier vote within 2.5 minutes after all is said and done. If I was a developer with DASH payouts as my only source of income, I would need the security of knowing that I am at least getting payments of those who initially voted "YES" for the spending proposal.

Both the Solarminer and Camosoul variants of the funding proposal can accommodate such requirements. Remember that it's up to the proposer to lay out their proposal and specify what they need in terms of funding, and when they need it. Not all proposals are going to be the same or have identical requirements, and we shouldn't try to shoe horn them all into the same mold. There's plenty of flexibility possible.

This concept would give the Masternode OPs The Power Of The Purse just like congress. Either we vote to spend on the DASH government(spending proposal) or save money into an escrow for next year's spending proposal. Saving is beneficial in multiple ways, it decreases supply and also acts as a nest egg for large-scale projects if the need arises.

See the many previous posts explaining why the pork barrel is a terrible idea.

 

[thelonecrouton]

How is this different from when it was taken from the miners and given to the masternodes? Why shouldn't a third arm that provides services (development) be paid?

They should be paid, in the same way that miners and MNs are paid - as they go and upon service provided, not upfront.

Given the piss-poor job miners as a whole do of securing the blockchain, with 90% of the lazy sods mining on the same 3 pools, I think 40% to the miners is generous. Blockchain security is the very foundation of DASH, the miners should be subject to minimum decentralisation performance standards. :tongue: And I say that as a miner. :smile:

The situation is different this time in that with the introduction of MNs, 100% of block reward was still going to infrastructure providers.

 

[chatterbox]

Mandatory payment, or taxation, to fund the development would certainly provide funding, but only at the cost our monetary freedom. Mandatory payment should be avoided, and I think it can be. I think implementing a system that allows the people to donate to projects that have been approved will prove satisfactory in funding of development. If a certain minimum is not met, funding from a source controlled by the foundation may be called to provide for that minimum. (The minimum would need to be defined)

Implementing a system for voting based on current stake for the lower decisions and master-node owners at the upper is a more fair and appropriate organization, IMO.

This would be similar to the US legislative body House and Senate. There could then be self-governing rules in place to act as checks-and-balances. Perhaps each house gets 50/50 vote.

On top of this, the Dash Foundation should reserve the right to propose core development and to veto decisions with a 2/3 vote majority or more.

Finally, if the people cannot get along, they may fork (revolution)?

 

[Solarminer]

They should be paid, in the same way that miners and MNs are paid - as they go and upon service provided, not upfront.

Given the piss-poor job miners as a whole do of securing the blockchain, with 90% of the lazy sods mining on the same 3 pools, I think 40% to the miners is generous. Blockchain security is the very foundation of DASH, the miners should be subject to minimum decentralisation performance standards. :tongue: And I say that as a miner. :smile:

The situation is different this time in that with the introduction of MNs, 100% of block reward was still going to infrastructure providers.

As a past pool owner, I can say that there is almost no money in running a pool. It would also be much easier for a pool to just take miners funds than to try to do an attack on the network. So I don't see that mining to 3 pools is that big of a deal. If we pushed a reward out to P2P nodes we could force some decentralized hashrate. I don't see this as an issue. But if there are others that think it is important it could be brought up to a vote.

 

[Solarminer]

Mandatory payment, or taxation, to fund the development would certainly provide funding, but only at the cost our monetary freedom. Mandatory payment should be avoided, and I think it can be. I think implementing a system that allows the people to donate to projects that have been approved will prove satisfactory in funding of development. If a certain minimum is not met, funding from a source controlled by the foundation may be called to provide for that minimum. (The minimum would need to be defined)

Implementing a system for voting based on current stake for the lower decisions and master-node owners at the upper is a more fair and appropriate organization, IMO.

This would be similar to the US legislative body House and Senate. There could then be self-governing rules in place to act as checks-and-balances. Perhaps each house gets 50/50 vote.

On top of this, the Dash Foundation should reserve the right to propose core development and to veto decisions with a 2/3 vote majority or more.

Finally, if the people cannot get along, they may fork (revolution)?

I understand your train of thought here. Keep in mind that masternodes have 1000 DASH so they are a good sample of the investor. They are also the best to determining the tradoff between immediate rewards lost vs long term DASH value gain.

If you start having a 'voting proxy' such as a senate or house vote system, it will eventually get corrupted. Now we have bills that go through that a party contributor(name fortune 500 company here) will get a few paragraphs in it to increase their bottom line. It is really a pay per vote system to promote the biggest companies. This system may have been the best way 200 years ago when a letter and stamp was the fastest method of communication, but there is really no reason to look at this now.

I would look at this a different way. Instead of the DASH Foundation having additional rights, they should offer guidance. The Foundation can create projects to vote on. Give timelines/long term goals for what they think would be best for DASH and why. Communicate issues with code problems or changes requested by outside parties.

If the foundation has masternodes, then they vote based on how many masternodes they own. There should also be a way to vote out a project with a masternode vote, but that shouldn't only be a Foundation decision.

 

[Solarminer]

There needs to be some sort of time commitment by the masternodes that voted YES to the spending proposal or they can easily change thier vote within 2.5 minutes after all is said and done. If I was a developer with DASH payouts as my only source of income, I would need the security of knowing that I am at least getting payments of those who initially voted "YES" for the yearly, spending proposal.

This concept would give the Masternode OPs The Power Of The Purse just like congress. Either we vote to spend on the DASH government(spending proposal) or save money into an escrow for next year's spending proposal. Saving is beneficial in multiple ways, it decreases supply and also acts as a nest egg for large-scale projects if the need arises.

Edit:

Also, since only one spending proposal can be elected via votes per year, the submitter would pretty much be the point of contact as to how things are running (if they're not anonymous). He/she would most likely be the representative/face of the DASH governance for that years time. I, as a MNO, am not going to be reading about every project in the proposal but will depend heavily on the reputation of the submitter(s) of the spending proposal(i.e. Evan Duffield).

It sounds like that one proposal per year should be a good one. If it doesn't get voted on that is another year without any development. We can be much faster than this. 3 mo is about right for a 2week vote. Masternodes are already having to update nodes every few weeks and get than done in a few days. This shouldn't be an issue.

I was thinking the votes are open for 2 weeks. Then the projects move through. Projects can only be voted out with a removal proposal and a majority no vote.

Congress is broken. Please don't bring it up like it is a good idea.

 

[fulltimegeek]

It sounds like that one proposal per year should be a good one. If it doesn't get voted on that is another year without any development. We can be much faster than this. 3 mo is about right for a 2week vote. Masternodes are already having to update nodes every few weeks and get than done in a few days. This shouldn't be an issue.

I was thinking the votes are open for 2 weeks. Then the projects move through. Projects can only be voted out with a removal proposal and a majority no vote.

Congress is broken. Please don't bring it up like it is a good idea.

3 months for every spending proposal sounds okay to me. I just don't want to have to vote every day on some new project that I do not have time to study up on.

Also, I totally agree with you with the current state of congress. But, to the best of my knowledge, it did work relatively well when the Constitutional Republic first began. Of course, there are a slew of people that would 100% disagree with that statement.

 

[chatterbox]

Congress is broken. Please don't bring it up like it is a good idea.

There are problems with nearly every system, but finding the most fair is the goal. There will be no perfect system agreed by all. I think the US congressional system has been effective despite its shortcomings. I do not know of any governance that's more fair but I'm open to suggestions better.

Congress is not broken, but the politicians. That's what happens when you trust liars.