Acedian
Active member
Vote for the 1 Dash, if there is an issue the value can be adjusted quickly. $75 per spam proposal will be sufficient!
Pre-Proposal: DASH Proposal fee lowered to 1.0 DASH
- Thread starter Technologov
- Start date
Vedran Yoweri
Active member
Maybe check this wiseguy out also. 
Biltong
Active member
Higher up I said I voted YES. I assumed things were quiet, but in the last couple of days I learned the opposite: Dash Force is under considerable pressure - they have a wide variety of things happening at the same time (Dash Force News is just the latest addition) and on top of that they are handling a host of little Proposals (meetups/videos/adds etc) that we don’t hear about on the Forum. Until the PEC (Proposal Evaluation Committee) is up and running it might be dangerous to open the floodgates. We might lose good people through burnout. Let’s be patient and 1st get the systems in place to handle a flood. And even then, a smaller decrease to 3 Dash might be more advisable. I'm changing my vote to NO, not yet.
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c3works
Member
Good choice, IMO. Just 'changing the number' doesn't really solve anything...it just covers over the intended issue for some period while introducing new risks as you mention.
Better to either:
1 - Leave the fee alone and build some sort of sponsorship/crowdfunding mechanism to enable voluntary fee support to a proposer,
2 - Build a dynamic fee using some algorithm that measures congestion (sort of like difficulty does for mining), or
3 - Weigh up some stipend-like process that lets smaller proposals get vetted by core devs currently under contract (sort of a subcontracted arrangement). I believe there is a proposal working to test this idea out right now.
Regardless, just changing the number isn't a good answer. More thought is needed before taking this on, especially in this high growth environment. Bad time to mis-step.
(Please note, all three here are attempts to accommodate the intent of what the YES voters are seeking)
demo
Well-known member
The YES voters are seeking governance. Your whole way of thinking is towards the reduction of the governance power of the masternodes, you propose the transfer of the governance power to various outsiders.
You are clearly against the idea "the masternodes should be able to decide".
Your attitude seems suspicious. Are you a spy or smth?
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Hi @akhavr!
I love tipbots!
But, I think there's a possible legal liability there.
Easy to label as jurisdiction-crossing money transmitting; Something to avoid.
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As far as the proposal fee goes, I think you guys are working the wrong problem.
There's a lot of value in the concept of "Put up or shut up."
Five hundred dollars (or thereabouts), is a strong disincentive to the
apathetic, and a decent indicator of an individual's commitment to accomplish
a project's particular goal.
I think that gesture is important to the masternode vote holders.
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Alternately, a system that guarantees proposal approval by formalizing and
standardizing the process. By the time it's proposal submission time,
everybody's already familiar with the proposal, agreed on deliverables,
indicated their support. Five dash won't be at risk if all the boxes are
ticked.
But, I also think proposal goals should be significant, innovative, and
proportionately expensive to achieve. I hope for people to dream bigger, where
the 5 dash fee is but a few, if that, percent of the maybe-world-changing
funds. But, I'm an idealist. And a cow.
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I think we need to create different mechanisms for different economic needs.
Possibly interrelated, but each catering to the capabilities of the participants.
Begin cow thoughts...
[BGCOLOR=#4d5167]Interactive/small quorum lending and reputation systems for micro-economies[/BGCOLOR]
- Borrower-generated dash addresses serve as pseudo-identities for reputation and contract paths for fulfillment and reimbursement.
- Moneys flowing through the address trigger contract bookkeeping functions
- Earned positive reputation motivates borrowers to honor even small contracts.
- Earned positive reputation reassures lenders leading to repeat business, better deals.
- (time scaled (recent most weighted) weighting may apply here.)
- Nothing to arbitrate, terms are network-defined, payments happen, or they don't
- Actualized using ephemeral gobjects/python extensions
- pre-build boilerplate contracts
- new contract types == git pull + network sync
- p2p gossip threshold activates new contract types
- externally processed by python
- namespace-scoped stateful processing
- one to one mapping of contracts and code (objects)
- Vetted by mainnet
- p2p progation on validation
[BGCOLOR=#4d5167]Proxied quorum - monitored project assessment/fulfillment[/BGCOLOR]
- project-appropriate set of closely involved masternode owners have final word on disbursement
- owners selected for domain expertise
- n-of-m must vote to release funds
- proposal end date set to allow for a certain amount of non-payment cycles
- applied when required by the community as a precondition for acceptance
- for simplicity:
- proxy votes permanently assigned before submission
- new key, new hash, new proposal
- same with threshold.
- proxy votes permanently assigned before submission
- actualized by extending, via new type, the current proposal gobject
- by two attributes
- [ proxy_mn_address_1, proxy_mn_address_2, ..., n ]
- required quorum threshold, immutable
- and one directive
- create subsidy if and only if sub-committee/quorum threshold met
- (maybe incentivise participation. votes == payout regardless of vote direction)
- by two attributes
Ok, that's enough rambling for tonight, need to get some shut-eye.
Ok, then you won't outright ban the tipbot user for strange posts while I'm debugging it
How is this solved for reddit/slack/whatever tipbots? Who's liable? Forum owner(s) or tipbot operator? I bet it's just ignored for the moment.
Too hard for my undercaffeinated mind. Will wait for more detailed explanation