How to strenghten Dash's Voting System

[qwizzie]

Problem : masternode budget proposal voting participation is currently too low, this can be observed on below overview's last column (Total Ratio).

https://dashninja.pl/budgets.html

Focus-point 1 :

How to reach more masternode owners with regards to budget proposals to vote on, taking into account the difference in location, language and use of forum ?

Possible solution :

Treat and publish every budget proposal the same way, regardless whether it is originating from the Dash development team or from someone in the Dash community. This means every single masternode budget proposal will need to get published on all available communication channels (Bitcointalk forum, Dashtalk forum, Dashwhale, Twitter and Reddit) and will most likely need to get translated on localized forums by local Dash representatives there as well.

Focus-point 2 :

Once we have reached the masternode owners with regards to new budget proposals, how do we keep them motivated to keep participating in the voting process ? Both for now and in the future ?

Possible solution :

Incentivize masternode owners to participate in the voting system. Current payment schedule is as follows :

45% of each block goes to miners
45% of each block goes to masternodes
10% of each block goes to the decentralised budget fund

Lets say for sake of argument we lower the % of each block going towards masternodes from 45% to 40% and
create a piece of code or a spork that will randomly verify masternodes on whether they have voted
on all budget proposals or not.

If they have voted on a budget proposal it will pay them 5% of the block per budget proposal.
If they have not voted on a budget proposal or reached their max voting reward they get skipped for that 5% payout.

Process :

Code / spork checks random masternodes and finds one of the following conditions :

A : masternode voted on a budget proposal and has not been rewarded for it yet --> it gets 5% of the block as reward
B : masternode voted on a budget proposal but got rewarded already* --> it gets skipped for the 5% block reward
* max number of rewards = total number of budget proposals on which the masternode voted, this means if a masternode voted on 5 budget proposals it will be eligable for 5x 5% payouts, after which it reaches its max.
(this means each masternode will need to build up a voting score, so the system knows if it is eligable for the 5% block reward or not).
C : masternode did not vote on a budget proposal --> masternode gets skipped for that 5% block reward
D : network finds all masternodes voted on all budget proposals (100% participation, highly unlikely but a man can dream ) --> it will deactivate the spork and the 5% flow back to the masternodes

This all could both encourage masternode owners to vote on budget proposals and inspire people
to create new budget proposals.

I'm thinking of asking the oracle part of the masternode network for advice but for now lets first discuss and see where it leads....

 

[oaxaca]

There's a line in my dash.conf file:

alertnotify=echo %s | mail -s "Dash Alert" [email protected]

Perhaps that could actually send an email to masternode owners when a new budget item is introduced.

 

[stan.distortion]

Imo a suggestion of Camosouls is the best so far, regarding voting as part of the services masternodes are expected to perform and so failure to vote fails proof of service. Alternatively, incentivising voting sounds good but splitting the proposal submission fee sounds better than issuing part of the block rewards. Slightly off topic but related to that, a floating fee to propose based on the size of the budget seems better than a fixed fixed fee as a fixed fee discourages small proposals for minor improvements.

 

[qwizzie]

Imo a suggestion of Camosouls is the best so far, regarding voting as part of the services masternodes are expected to perform and so failure to vote fails proof of service.

Unfortunetely the masternode voting part has been added on in a much later phase and is therefore not part of services masternodes are exspected to perform (they are optional services that can't just simply be enforced later on) , appearently (looking at the participation %) the main reason people run these masternodes is for the MN payouts.

 

[stan.distortion]

Unfortunetely the masternode voting part has been added on in a much later phase and is therefore not part of services masternodes are exspected to perform (they are optional services that can't just simply be enforced later on) , appearently (looking at the participation %) the main reason people run these masternodes is for the MN payouts.

Then let 'em work for their supper, the dev's aren't getting paid to go off on holiday... oh, wait :grin: Just kidding but I do feel masternodes come with responsibilities and decisions on budgets are a very important part of how the network functions but in hindsight I can't see how something like that could be tested because of the duration, cut payments until votes are cast and there's no live discussion period, cut payments after and the node can be moved to get around it. Maybe that's enough of a penalty to make it easier to remember to vote next time, idk.

 

[tungfa]

I personally think you can not force voting and encouragement with payment for votes is just ethically wrong .

I think we need
- ether that webpage which only deals with budgets , votes , proposals (dash whale style ) to encourage and simplify voting
- or post better budget announcements with
more details
all budgets posted , explanations , voting code and all in 1 message once a month.

the normal world votes (general elections) in a range of 40-50% (if lucky) and we are exactly in that range !

 

[lynx]

Forced voting is very stupid IMO. Operators who aren't interested in voting will just vote YES / NO / RANDOM in every proposal in order to get paid and this will screw up the voting process. Not voting is already a vote to abstain. The MN collateral is a sizable amount of money, I think participating in the governance is already encouraged through potential appreciation of the collateral value when making the right governance decisions. If people don't care much about their wealth, there is really nothing you can do.

 

[bhkien]

I don't think we need any reward for voting.

Masternode owners have their own motivation for protect their investment.

 

[Naruto]

I don't think we need any reward for voting.

Masternode owners have their own motivation for protect their investment.

True. All we need to do is to remind them how important of the proposal is and remind them the Deadline of Voting

 

[crowning]

I personally think you can not force voting and encouragement with payment for votes is just ethically wrong .

A Masternode which doesn't vote for all proposals won't get payments any more

A new option for Proof of Service, the Masternode's score goes down for each unvoted proposal

 

[tungfa]

A Masternode which doesn't vote for all proposals won't get payments any more

[don't you wipe me]
:wink:

 

[Solarminer]

I'll summarize changes I would recommend:

• Add a 10% higher vote percentage requirement to larger proposals(over $1000).
• Add a cutoff deadline of 1 month in advance of voting. If a proposal doesn't meet the cutoff it bounces to the next month.
• Change to a minimum 20% requirement for proposal to get accepted. (Prevent major holders from voting for their own proposals)

I disagree with charging for not voting/rewarding for voting. Proposals need to bring the votes - either for or against.

 

[stan.distortion]

A Masternode which doesn't vote for all proposals won't get payments any more

A new option for Proof of Service, the Masternode's score goes down for each unvoted proposal

Much better.

Quorums. I was surprised to see nature uses them for group decision making, anyone know if there are any examples that could be applied to the voting system? If it's one of natures solutions then it can probably do a better job than the system's we're used too.

EDIT: Wow, crypto bacteria:
https://www.ted.com/talks/bonnie_bassler_on_how_bacteria_communicate?language=en#t-880107
Bonnie Bassler could be worth talking to sometime, could be lots of examples of how bacterial communications could be applied to networks and maybe examples networks have evolved that could be relevant to bacterial research. Lots of other studies relevant to various species and probably more easily related to voting, ants searching for nesting sites based on conditions and resources seemed applicable.