Btw, I'm not sure why there is a discrepancy in the vote count between Dash Central and DMT.
Decision Proposal: Increase Proposal System Flexibility & Efficiency
- Thread starter Mark Mason
- Start date
Geert
Active member
I would like them to tell us if they support the DCG proposal or not. And why.
(copied from DashCentral)
If you have voted NO on the Phase 2 proposal, please reconsider. This is important.
DCG’s proposed changes would definitely improve the economic incentives of Dash. After Chain Locks were introduced, Dash’s fundamental security spending needs have changed. This proposal now is objectively a major step in the right direction toward optimizing block reward allocations to benefit the entire network’s value going forward. Please realize that there is a logical economic solution to this problem. DCG’s proposal moves us toward a lower and more stable inflation rate in circulating supply, which benefits everyone - including miners. And directly cost-incentivizing treasury spending votes according to the MNO’s portion of expected value gained by the entire network creates a better likelihood of high quality voting. (I believe DCG’s proposal isn’t quite optimal or perfect, but it does capture good value to better align voting incentives and reduce unnecessary security spending, and therefore is certainly worth implementing as soon as possible.)
Some of you are concerned that MNOs will overspend or underspend if this proposal passes. If the goal is to maximize benefit to the whole network, which mostly means maximizing the expected resulting price of Dash, then there should be an optimal treasury spending threshold where positive expected value proposals pass and negative expected value proposals do not pass. Properly aligned incentives are the correct answer. Emotional disagreeing opinions or guesses are not a useful way to decide this.
We have only two choices right now, DCG’s proposal or status quo. The DCG proposal is objectively better and needs to get implemented right away. 2021 will be such an import year for Dash. We need the inflating-circulating-supply issue to be addressed as soon as possible. Please vote yes. (Or convince me otherwise.)
Guys, keep in mind that all of us want the best for Dash; we’re on the same team. Of course we each want to contribute ideas and opinions about what to do and why to do it, and everyone’s thoughts are helpful. But please remain rational and don’t become staunchly married to your ideas. Try to stay open-minded, in search of the true answer, and realize that someone who disagrees with your ideas is also trying to help and improve Dash’s value just like you are.
I want to see Dash in the top 5 next year!
If you have voted NO on the Phase 2 proposal, please reconsider. This is important.
DCG’s proposed changes would definitely improve the economic incentives of Dash. After Chain Locks were introduced, Dash’s fundamental security spending needs have changed. This proposal now is objectively a major step in the right direction toward optimizing block reward allocations to benefit the entire network’s value going forward. Please realize that there is a logical economic solution to this problem. DCG’s proposal moves us toward a lower and more stable inflation rate in circulating supply, which benefits everyone - including miners. And directly cost-incentivizing treasury spending votes according to the MNO’s portion of expected value gained by the entire network creates a better likelihood of high quality voting. (I believe DCG’s proposal isn’t quite optimal or perfect, but it does capture good value to better align voting incentives and reduce unnecessary security spending, and therefore is certainly worth implementing as soon as possible.)
Some of you are concerned that MNOs will overspend or underspend if this proposal passes. If the goal is to maximize benefit to the whole network, which mostly means maximizing the expected resulting price of Dash, then there should be an optimal treasury spending threshold where positive expected value proposals pass and negative expected value proposals do not pass. Properly aligned incentives are the correct answer. Emotional disagreeing opinions or guesses are not a useful way to decide this.
We have only two choices right now, DCG’s proposal or status quo. The DCG proposal is objectively better and needs to get implemented right away. 2021 will be such an import year for Dash. We need the inflating-circulating-supply issue to be addressed as soon as possible. Please vote yes. (Or convince me otherwise.)
Guys, keep in mind that all of us want the best for Dash; we’re on the same team. Of course we each want to contribute ideas and opinions about what to do and why to do it, and everyone’s thoughts are helpful. But please remain rational and don’t become staunchly married to your ideas. Try to stay open-minded, in search of the true answer, and realize that someone who disagrees with your ideas is also trying to help and improve Dash’s value just like you are.
I want to see Dash in the top 5 next year!
quizzie's concerns about increasing the treasury cap above 10% do not account for the positive value proposition that Dash's treasury now allows.
The network needs to spend its block reward on mining security, masternode services, and treasury budget. When Chain Locks were implemented, that changed our network's spending needs; it freed up some potential room in the budget. It is prudent to now shift rewards to an optimal payout level to maximize the value of Dash: that means maximizing the treasury proposals that deliver more expected value to Dash (+ev) than their cost, as far as possible up to the point that it does not interfere with the continuity of both functionality and security. Every +ev proposal, by definition, is expected to add more value to Dash than its cost to the network. Since Chain Locks provided more room to safely allocate budget to treasury, it is now objectively correct, for the optimal economics of Dash, to do so. This is not a matter of preference or opinion, it is the solution to an optimization problem.
You are misunderstanding the concept of +ev proposals. If a proposal owner's "selling of Dash on the market" does indeed create more downward pressure on Dash than the expected future upward buying pressure generated by the proposal's efforts, then it would not be a +ev proposal.
We should ideally have as many +ev passing proposals as the overall budget can afford once all of the functionality and security needs are fully met. DCG suggests a 20% treasury cap, and I agree with that amount. If you see it otherwise, please justify why you think it would ever make sense to thwart the judicious use of budget for +ev, value-adding proposals.
If it's because you don't trust MNOs to make good voting decisions, that is not a valid reason to misalign incentives according to your personal preferences rather than have them be optimally aligned for a maximized return of value.
It is important that we implement DCG's proposal right away so that Dash will be as economically competitive as possible in 2021. Big money is entering the crypto space, and Dash's fundamentals need to be figured out and optimized now. If we can reduce the circulating supply inflation to a competitive and stable level, it will help give Dash a better chance of outperforming other cryptos, moving up on the charts and gaining more exposure and recognition and respect, and eventually being a contender for mass adoption as digital cash and as a social payments platform.
If you own one or more masternodes, I'm sure you would love to see the value of Dash rise as much as possible. Let's all look at this objectively with a rational open mind, and let's find the truly best solution to make it happen. Please evaluate my arguments without an emotional prejudice to be disagreeable, but see the economic logic of my arguments. Thanks.
The network needs to spend its block reward on mining security, masternode services, and treasury budget. When Chain Locks were implemented, that changed our network's spending needs; it freed up some potential room in the budget. It is prudent to now shift rewards to an optimal payout level to maximize the value of Dash: that means maximizing the treasury proposals that deliver more expected value to Dash (+ev) than their cost, as far as possible up to the point that it does not interfere with the continuity of both functionality and security. Every +ev proposal, by definition, is expected to add more value to Dash than its cost to the network. Since Chain Locks provided more room to safely allocate budget to treasury, it is now objectively correct, for the optimal economics of Dash, to do so. This is not a matter of preference or opinion, it is the solution to an optimization problem.
You are misunderstanding the concept of +ev proposals. If a proposal owner's "selling of Dash on the market" does indeed create more downward pressure on Dash than the expected future upward buying pressure generated by the proposal's efforts, then it would not be a +ev proposal.
We should ideally have as many +ev passing proposals as the overall budget can afford once all of the functionality and security needs are fully met. DCG suggests a 20% treasury cap, and I agree with that amount. If you see it otherwise, please justify why you think it would ever make sense to thwart the judicious use of budget for +ev, value-adding proposals.
If it's because you don't trust MNOs to make good voting decisions, that is not a valid reason to misalign incentives according to your personal preferences rather than have them be optimally aligned for a maximized return of value.
It is important that we implement DCG's proposal right away so that Dash will be as economically competitive as possible in 2021. Big money is entering the crypto space, and Dash's fundamentals need to be figured out and optimized now. If we can reduce the circulating supply inflation to a competitive and stable level, it will help give Dash a better chance of outperforming other cryptos, moving up on the charts and gaining more exposure and recognition and respect, and eventually being a contender for mass adoption as digital cash and as a social payments platform.
If you own one or more masternodes, I'm sure you would love to see the value of Dash rise as much as possible. Let's all look at this objectively with a rational open mind, and let's find the truly best solution to make it happen. Please evaluate my arguments without an emotional prejudice to be disagreeable, but see the economic logic of my arguments. Thanks.
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Geert
Active member
(copied from DashCentral)
If you think about it, the way the DAO works now, where MNOs give out funds that don't cost them anything, but which are in fact a tax upon every Dash hodler, it's a bit pompous and a bit corrupt. IT'S NO BETTER THAN HOW THE THE US CONGRESS WORKS.
And this is probably why we end up funding such losers. And why we end up funding them WAY too long.
If you think about it, the way the DAO works now, where MNOs give out funds that don't cost them anything, but which are in fact a tax upon every Dash hodler, it's a bit pompous and a bit corrupt. IT'S NO BETTER THAN HOW THE THE US CONGRESS WORKS.
And this is probably why we end up funding such losers. And why we end up funding them WAY too long.
This is like watching bank robbers fight over how they're going to divide their stash!
Meanwhile, I have a concept that needs some work called One Dollar One Vote Governance and I'd appreciate some feedback. I realize, of course, that DCG will not comment or contribute to it, though they always seem keen to "discuss" their own proposals.
The important difference is, the DCG proposal is about self interest written in a few lines of code, whereas a real proposal would try to build bridges and engage with our end users.
Right now, people on the outside looking in, they see a small group of privileged individuals running the show. Whether it's marketing, development, masternodes or integrations, there's almost no incentive for outsiders to contribute for free when they see others getting paid. Compare this to bitcoin where, for example, there is more than one server implementation. Anyone here want to try their hand at building a Go or Rust version of the server? - I thought not. All the servers and tooling here at dash, are almost exclusively born from the treasury. Even if we expand development to 90%, the same underlying problem will exist; the treasury kills outside incentives and innovations.
Take a look at bitcoin and bitcoin cash. On the one side there is Andreas Antonopoulos and the other has Roger Ver. Both very passionate and excellent public speakers. Yes they are big bag holders but there's no bitcoin treasury perpetually paying them off every month. People see this for what it is, passion and independence. Independence means unattached, and we can't even classify Joel and Mark into that bag because they are tainted for being masternode owners, paid every nine days to shill. Who here is going to declare independence yet stand up and defend dash so vigorously, anyone?
The kind of changes we need are going to take real work and actual lines of code. And it's going to take some strength to fight off bad habits by trying sometihng new and radical.
Meanwhile, I have a concept that needs some work called One Dollar One Vote Governance and I'd appreciate some feedback. I realize, of course, that DCG will not comment or contribute to it, though they always seem keen to "discuss" their own proposals.
The important difference is, the DCG proposal is about self interest written in a few lines of code, whereas a real proposal would try to build bridges and engage with our end users.
Right now, people on the outside looking in, they see a small group of privileged individuals running the show. Whether it's marketing, development, masternodes or integrations, there's almost no incentive for outsiders to contribute for free when they see others getting paid. Compare this to bitcoin where, for example, there is more than one server implementation. Anyone here want to try their hand at building a Go or Rust version of the server? - I thought not. All the servers and tooling here at dash, are almost exclusively born from the treasury. Even if we expand development to 90%, the same underlying problem will exist; the treasury kills outside incentives and innovations.
Take a look at bitcoin and bitcoin cash. On the one side there is Andreas Antonopoulos and the other has Roger Ver. Both very passionate and excellent public speakers. Yes they are big bag holders but there's no bitcoin treasury perpetually paying them off every month. People see this for what it is, passion and independence. Independence means unattached, and we can't even classify Joel and Mark into that bag because they are tainted for being masternode owners, paid every nine days to shill. Who here is going to declare independence yet stand up and defend dash so vigorously, anyone?
The kind of changes we need are going to take real work and actual lines of code. And it's going to take some strength to fight off bad habits by trying sometihng new and radical.
Geert
Active member
We need to kill more. The history of our treasury can be summed up with the following slogan...
Funding products no one needed that never arrived.
And yet you are pushing hard for the DAO treasury allocation proposal to pass.
That makes about as much sense as a dry year and I wore two raincoats.
Geert
Active member
The proposal if implemented will help prevent wasteful spending because it will come out of our pockets.
How many votes do you have? Would you please go on DC and recant and tell everyone how you've seen the light and want the proposal to pass?
Geert
Active member
It looks like the nerd herd does not want to give up the prerogative of spending other people's money. How weird is that? They could take possession of the same money and then spend it but no. Let's go over their possible reasons for no votes...
1 - They don't understand the proposal.
2 - Voted no because they don't have time or attention span to consider the proposal.
3 - They don't like it because it's from DCG.
4- They don't trust other MNOs to support their pet projects under the plan.
1 - They don't understand the proposal.
2 - Voted no because they don't have time or attention span to consider the proposal.
3 - They don't like it because it's from DCG.
4- They don't trust other MNOs to support their pet projects under the plan.
5 - The don't understand how economic value maximization works.
6 - They may not realize how critical and urgent this is: Dash needs to be economically optimized as soon as possible in order to have the best chance to grow, advance, and compete during the likely bull run in 2021.
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Geert
Active member
I have a new theory that is grounded in SCIENCE!
People become risk-averse when they're stressed. This whole proposal is about risk and reward. People are overweighing the potential risks of the plan due to the stress of the pandemic and everything else.
We need to retry this proposal at a later date if it fails, maybe with a minor change so the "no voters" can save face.
People become risk-averse when they're stressed. This whole proposal is about risk and reward. People are overweighing the potential risks of the plan due to the stress of the pandemic and everything else.
We need to retry this proposal at a later date if it fails, maybe with a minor change so the "no voters" can save face.
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That's a valid reason. Perhaps we can rewrite it as:
7. MNOs are finally gaining some healthy skepticism.
It's not so bad to demand something a bit more ground breaking than a few lines of code. Like a decentralized kickstarter; someone, anyone, can put money into a proposal and if it doesn't reach it's goal, the funders get their money back. It doesn't all have to be about masternodes and miners.
vazaki3
Well-known member
Who is demo? I am vazaki3.
Why be in a hurry, in order to satisfy some people who want us to be in a hurry (mostly for malicious purposes and for their own benefit) ???
Decision proposals should not have a dead line, unless this is absolutely necessary.
There are millions of decision proposals that wait patiently for you to vote for them .
ex. https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/pre-proposal-would-you-like-to-be-able-to-vote-with-number.9081/
Please dont fall into the advertising trap of the malicious (and of the rich who have money to spend in order to propose). Dont be in a hurry. Think carefully before voting for decisions, and ALWAYS preserve your right to reconsider and reverse whatever decision is based on your own vote.
(Censored video)
My original video was censored , so here you are an alternative--->
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(copied from DashCentral)
It’s frustrating that you and others here don’t understand why economic value incentives should be optimized. In your opinion, you think that if we do improve the incentives, then MNOs will react to the change by overspending (or underspending) because they’re all stupid and irrational or whatever. You think YOU know better than everyone else when it comes to deciding what adds value to Dash. And therefore, your solution to the voters’ poor decision-making is to misallocate block rewards (supply inflation) in a way that directly increases relative downward pressure on Dash’s price and would likely prevent some value-adding +ev proposals from being funded.
+Ev proposals are called +ev proposals because they add more value than their cost. => As many +ev proposals as the block reward budget can afford, after fully paying for continuous network security and functionality, should be included and funded. A 20% treasury cap does this.
So then if MNOs were to make bad decisions or mistakes in their assessment of how much value will be added by proposals, their mistakes would hurt their investment’s value. That perfect incentive is what will make MNOs take voting most seriously.
To keep incentives misaligned instead - just because of opinions, emotions, or guesses - is definitely the incorrect thing to do. The correct optimal solution is more likely to maximize Dash’s expected value.
Please have the humility to seek the actual true solution that would maximize Dash’s value. If you own one or more masternodes, you have a large investment in Dash. You should realize that you will benefit more from implementing the best economic solution that adds maximum value to Dash than from basing this decision on personal opinions. I want 2021 to be really amazing for Dash, and I think this change to more optimal incentives needs to happen as soon as possible for Dash to advance and succeed this year. Choose the correct economic solution. Anything else would make/keep things worse.
Happy New Year Dash Community!!
hipnotic said:
It’s frustrating that you and others here don’t understand why economic value incentives should be optimized. In your opinion, you think that if we do improve the incentives, then MNOs will react to the change by overspending (or underspending) because they’re all stupid and irrational or whatever. You think YOU know better than everyone else when it comes to deciding what adds value to Dash. And therefore, your solution to the voters’ poor decision-making is to misallocate block rewards (supply inflation) in a way that directly increases relative downward pressure on Dash’s price and would likely prevent some value-adding +ev proposals from being funded.
+Ev proposals are called +ev proposals because they add more value than their cost. => As many +ev proposals as the block reward budget can afford, after fully paying for continuous network security and functionality, should be included and funded. A 20% treasury cap does this.
So then if MNOs were to make bad decisions or mistakes in their assessment of how much value will be added by proposals, their mistakes would hurt their investment’s value. That perfect incentive is what will make MNOs take voting most seriously.
To keep incentives misaligned instead - just because of opinions, emotions, or guesses - is definitely the incorrect thing to do. The correct optimal solution is more likely to maximize Dash’s expected value.
Please have the humility to seek the actual true solution that would maximize Dash’s value. If you own one or more masternodes, you have a large investment in Dash. You should realize that you will benefit more from implementing the best economic solution that adds maximum value to Dash than from basing this decision on personal opinions. I want 2021 to be really amazing for Dash, and I think this change to more optimal incentives needs to happen as soon as possible for Dash to advance and succeed this year. Choose the correct economic solution. Anything else would make/keep things worse.
Happy New Year Dash Community!!
(copied from DashCentral)
It’s frustrating that you and others here don’t understand why economic value incentives should be optimized. In your opinion, you think that if we do improve the incentives, then MNOs will react to the change by overspending (or underspending) because they’re all stupid and irrational or whatever. You think YOU know better than everyone else when it comes to deciding what adds value to Dash. And therefore, your solution to the voters’ poor decision-making is to misallocate block rewards (supply inflation) in a way that directly increases relative downward pressure on Dash’s price and would likely prevent some value-adding +ev proposals from being funded.
+Ev proposals are called +ev proposals because they add more value than their cost. => As many +ev proposals as the block reward budget can afford, after fully paying for continuous network security and functionality, should be included and funded. A 20% treasury cap does this.
So then if MNOs were to make bad decisions or mistakes in their assessment of how much value will be added by proposals, their mistakes would hurt their investment’s value. That perfect incentive is what will make MNOs take voting most seriously.
To keep incentives misaligned instead - just because of opinions, emotions, or guesses - is definitely the incorrect thing to do. The correct optimal solution is more likely to maximize Dash’s expected value.
Please have the humility to seek the actual true solution that would maximize Dash’s value. If you own one or more masternodes, you have a large investment in Dash. You should realize that you will benefit more from implementing the best economic solution that adds maximum value to Dash than from basing this decision on personal opinions. I want 2021 to be really amazing for Dash, and I think this change to more optimal incentives needs to happen as soon as possible for Dash to advance and succeed this year. Choose the correct economic solution. Anything else would make/keep things worse.
Happy New Year Dash Community!!
Please take a moment to vote in a poll to adjust incentives: