Without expressing any support or lack of support for either side, this is a fantastic example of what happens when substantive issues are not communicated to the Masternode community well. And well in advance. Let it not be so in the future if at all humanly possible.
Dash Incubator: Vote on Appointment of new Proposal Owner
- Thread starter AndyDark
- Start date
Hi Andy, please add me as a "No". I also echo Spectrapod's statement
EDIT:
Clarifying that I agree with Spectrapod that I don't have major issues with the structure being proposed but I do have grave concerns with rather how things were conducted recently, proposal-wise. This should be addressed further internally IMO before any other major decisions are made, therefore voting "No".
EDIT:
Clarifying that I agree with Spectrapod that I don't have major issues with the structure being proposed but I do have grave concerns with rather how things were conducted recently, proposal-wise. This should be addressed further internally IMO before any other major decisions are made, therefore voting "No".
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AndyDark
Well-known member
I would like to understand what specific privileges the Proposal Owner has that the Admins don't have. Is it a matter of who controls
the Incubator funds? Are there any other privileges?
As a DAO voter, I am trying to sort out why the Yes-voting admins have requested this vote, it still seems a bit murky to me what this
entire matter is about, and the Incubator has a pending funding request, would like further explanation of the reasons for a public vote
on the Forum for this, if there are problems with the current Proposal Owner, and since the vote is now public on the Forum, those need
to be disclosed so DAO voters can decide how they wish to proceed.
Can we get some of the Yes voters to clarify this issue so that DAO voters are better informed ahead of another funding decision?
the Incubator funds? Are there any other privileges?
As a DAO voter, I am trying to sort out why the Yes-voting admins have requested this vote, it still seems a bit murky to me what this
entire matter is about, and the Incubator has a pending funding request, would like further explanation of the reasons for a public vote
on the Forum for this, if there are problems with the current Proposal Owner, and since the vote is now public on the Forum, those need
to be disclosed so DAO voters can decide how they wish to proceed.
Can we get some of the Yes voters to clarify this issue so that DAO voters are better informed ahead of another funding decision?
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AndyDark
Well-known member
The PO is the Admin user that other Admins elect to raise proposals to the Network, custodies the superblock rewards in a wallet, and then pays them out solely for rewards on Tasks that other Admins award via Trello. It’s intended as a temporary position until the process to decentralise this across all Admins is finalised e.g. with a multi-sig wallet and a joint proposal from all Admins (which I know was being discussed and probably the cause of the issues here although its not my place to comment on that), and later using smart contracts (once implemented in the underlying protocol).
There were also some ‘super user’ privileges added later as a temporary measure / emergency powers, due to concerns about some gaps in the Rules, e.g. there’s no limits defined on spending so any Admin can technically spend any amount of the budget (on Tasks they set and approve the Output of) and the plan was to remove these once the way to decentralize this across Admins was worked out via the Rules.
All of these PO rights are detailed in Section 5.3 Proposal Owner of the Incubator Rules.
Multi sig was never mentioned before your comment, I am not against that, but I AM unhappy how this has been presented to the Network.
Why wasn't multi sig brought up as its own issue instead of this drama during the depths of a bear market. Do you understand the position
this puts DAO voters in?
AndyDark
Well-known member
Right now there's nothing here of relevance to the current proposal cycle, this is an internal Incubator governance vote that's as yet undecided... Rion will be Incubator PO for this cycle regardless of the outcome: Without a Rule change reflecting the move to a shared proposal, the Admins raising this vote shouldn't have raised any proposal (which they've withdrawn now anyway) and Rion's proposal should be going ahead as normal and not referencing this vote as it's outcome would only take affect next cycle...if it does MNOs can vote on this then by voting on the next proposal that's raised.
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Sam Kirby
New member
Hi all, Some background. I’ve been an Incubator Admin for 18months, run the majority of active bounties including Jembe and Patreon, highest spending bounties Platform Issues and QA and am the most active Admin over the last 18months. I have a strong working relationship with the Platform team having led for a year a weekly triage with Incubator, DCG and the Community. I’m extremely passionate about the potential for Incubator and Dash and strongly believe in Andy’s vision for how that should be executed.
To clarify the Incubator Structure - we’re a flat system governed by Admins. Andy reserved himself a temporary super user role to enable him to resolve challenges during the phase of fast growth and handed this (PO) role to Rion last year (with the temporary super user clause still in the rules). Since October we’ve been in dispute over if this grants Rion the power to change the flat structure to a one at the top, beneficial dictator for life with him on top structure.
In March, after 6 months of internal disagreement, on request from other Admins (and at risk of ongoing struggles spilling public) Andy stepped in to mediate a compromise that included taking Rion’s name off future Proposals and adopting a Governance Committee to decide how to take forward further changes and to share the PO responsibilities.
We agreed this Network Proposal be posted under Dash Incubator with an intention for all Committee members to support it. Its production was tasked, reviewed and posted then withdrawn as a blank Placeholder Proposal had also been posted by Rion. It was a mistake to post the second Proposal while this topic was in conflict and without wider explanation to the Network, as was it for Rion to have posted his placeholder Proposal.
Rion's reluctance to give up super-user responsibilities, accept a governance committee until working under a neutral Proposal coupled with an unwillingness to post a neutral Proposal keeps this cycle of uncertainty going on indefinitely. I was asked by Admins supporting this vote to manage this transition and I’m happy to take that on if it allows us to finally move forward. Although I'm happy to write future Network proposals, I have no desire to take up a full PO position. I would rather work with others deciding, implementing changes and agreeing how best to provide the detail our MNO voters are asking for. The incubator is a flat organization and should remain that way until our best efforts prove that a better system is needed. Those best efforts are far from being met. If Andy stepping back in permanently or until we're working to our compromise becomes an option, this is something I’d also be happy to support.
(withdrawn) network Proposal FYI: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yj_IaahForTT8BrWnyaXnFr8k64Ww3ad_qxoPif5tS4/edit#
To clarify the Incubator Structure - we’re a flat system governed by Admins. Andy reserved himself a temporary super user role to enable him to resolve challenges during the phase of fast growth and handed this (PO) role to Rion last year (with the temporary super user clause still in the rules). Since October we’ve been in dispute over if this grants Rion the power to change the flat structure to a one at the top, beneficial dictator for life with him on top structure.
In March, after 6 months of internal disagreement, on request from other Admins (and at risk of ongoing struggles spilling public) Andy stepped in to mediate a compromise that included taking Rion’s name off future Proposals and adopting a Governance Committee to decide how to take forward further changes and to share the PO responsibilities.
We agreed this Network Proposal be posted under Dash Incubator with an intention for all Committee members to support it. Its production was tasked, reviewed and posted then withdrawn as a blank Placeholder Proposal had also been posted by Rion. It was a mistake to post the second Proposal while this topic was in conflict and without wider explanation to the Network, as was it for Rion to have posted his placeholder Proposal.
Rion's reluctance to give up super-user responsibilities, accept a governance committee until working under a neutral Proposal coupled with an unwillingness to post a neutral Proposal keeps this cycle of uncertainty going on indefinitely. I was asked by Admins supporting this vote to manage this transition and I’m happy to take that on if it allows us to finally move forward. Although I'm happy to write future Network proposals, I have no desire to take up a full PO position. I would rather work with others deciding, implementing changes and agreeing how best to provide the detail our MNO voters are asking for. The incubator is a flat organization and should remain that way until our best efforts prove that a better system is needed. Those best efforts are far from being met. If Andy stepping back in permanently or until we're working to our compromise becomes an option, this is something I’d also be happy to support.
(withdrawn) network Proposal FYI: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yj_IaahForTT8BrWnyaXnFr8k64Ww3ad_qxoPif5tS4/edit#
qwizzie
Well-known member
I am pretty sure Rion's budget proposal was created first and was initially not a blank Placeholder Proposal. It originally had full details as i remember, but was turned into a blank Placeholder Proposal after the second budget proposal emerged from DashIncubator that referenced this vote on the appointment of a new Dash Incubator Proposal Owner.
I am also curious about the 'We', were all 11 admins in full agreement here ?
Also i have difficulty understanding how the Dash Incubator Proposal Owner can be set aside like that by other admins. Should the procedure not be to first select a new Dash Incubator Proposal Owner (by internally organising a vote), before making budget proposals under the DashIncubator name ? (which by the way obscures if the budget proposal in question is coming from the Dash Incubator Proposal Owner or not, so as a masternode owner that votes on budget proposals i am not a fan of this).
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Sam Kirby
New member
Rions budget proposal was posted first and was blank - with the exception of a few lines of placeholder text.
We in this instance stands for the Incubator Governance Committee - at the time this agreement was in place, this committee was all Admins. Voting was not explicitly held in this instance as consensus was reached without objection - including budget proposals under the DashIncubator name.
qwizzie
Well-known member
It was not blank on Dash Central. It had full details, including a reference to the previous budget proposal and that it was requesting now more dash then that previous budget proposal. Anyways most Dash Central budget proposals are starting with empty proposal texts, to be filled later. Sometimes that happens a few hours later (after getting proposal owner claimed on Dash Central), sometimes a day later. But in the end that budget proposal had full details on Dash Central (i think at the time i was posting my comments on his budget proposal, some three days ago .. maybe a day later) and was actively being voted on. Masternode owners don't usually vote on blank budget proposals....
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cloudwheels
New member
By way of introduction, I have been involved with the Incubator, as it is now known, having worked with Andy to shape into it's current form and create the admin system before it was even known under that name.
I have the honour of being the first Dev to claim a bounty, and believe as strongly today as in those early times that the Incubator is an invaluable resource in keeping Dash at the forefront of crypto development.
In more recent times, involvement with other projects has prevented me from committing time to development tasks, but I have remained an admin, and primarily on a single incubator task, which is that which specifies the work of and rewards the "proposal owner".
As Sam has indicated above, for some time there has been a largely consensual attempt to do away with this centralised task (and I would make clear that I view it as a task like any other piece of work bountied by the Incubator as opposed to a 'role').
Again, Sam has suggested that the PO was only ever intended to be transient, and I can confirm that this is completely in line with the original intentions of Andy and myself in formulating the admin/governance system.
The fact that I have been supportive of Rion's execution of the PO task(s) is evident from the fact that I have 'signed off' the rewards on a weekly basis since appointment.
My primary interest is in the continued evolution and improvement of the Incubator in its ability to deliver results to the community, achieved through open and transparent governance. I believe my incubator colleagues would view me as taking a balanced, fair and moderate view on these matters of governance.
When Rion first approached me with the idea of reforming the system to one in which more account was given to project management and strategy, I believed this to be a move in the right direction. However, I openly criticised the particular implementation, involving a 'lead strategist' at the pinnicle of the funding pyramid, as being reminiscent of a 'ponzi' scheme, and created a bounty for Rion to further explore and document his proposal. An 'alternative' proposal was created by Sam, which recognised that this hierarchy was out of keeping with the move towards structuring the Incubator as a DAO.
Other admins have indicated above that they largely support the current thinking on restructuring. It is simply a question of implementing the changes. It was clearly agreed that the first, very simple step, was for the network proposal to be developed and submitted collectively.
It was with some frustration that I noted that Rion was unwilling to do this and, with some regret, I drew the conclusion that this was further and final evidence that he is essentially unwilling to accept the agreed upon devolution, and that this does not bode well for the Incubator's future: potentially allowing, as Sam suggests, for the irreversible self-appointment of a 'benevolent dictator' and permissioned, centralised decision taking.
I will make clear that I neither had any involvement in submitting a second network proposal (which has now been recognised as an unfortunate error), nor initially mooted the idea of a vote to replace Rion with Sam as the PO, but I have no doubt from witnessing some months of discussion and interaction from a relative distance, that the future of the Incubator is most likely to move in the envisaged de-centralised direction with Sam taking over this responsibility in the short term.
I am equally convinced that Rion will be able to make equally, if not more effective, contributions to the Incubator under the new structure, but I am afraid I feel obliged to declare that my honest belief is that it would ultimately damage the long term future of the Incubator if he were to continue to cling to this 'role', and therefore encourage all admins to vote 'YES' in this process.
I have the honour of being the first Dev to claim a bounty, and believe as strongly today as in those early times that the Incubator is an invaluable resource in keeping Dash at the forefront of crypto development.
In more recent times, involvement with other projects has prevented me from committing time to development tasks, but I have remained an admin, and primarily on a single incubator task, which is that which specifies the work of and rewards the "proposal owner".
As Sam has indicated above, for some time there has been a largely consensual attempt to do away with this centralised task (and I would make clear that I view it as a task like any other piece of work bountied by the Incubator as opposed to a 'role').
Again, Sam has suggested that the PO was only ever intended to be transient, and I can confirm that this is completely in line with the original intentions of Andy and myself in formulating the admin/governance system.
The fact that I have been supportive of Rion's execution of the PO task(s) is evident from the fact that I have 'signed off' the rewards on a weekly basis since appointment.
My primary interest is in the continued evolution and improvement of the Incubator in its ability to deliver results to the community, achieved through open and transparent governance. I believe my incubator colleagues would view me as taking a balanced, fair and moderate view on these matters of governance.
When Rion first approached me with the idea of reforming the system to one in which more account was given to project management and strategy, I believed this to be a move in the right direction. However, I openly criticised the particular implementation, involving a 'lead strategist' at the pinnicle of the funding pyramid, as being reminiscent of a 'ponzi' scheme, and created a bounty for Rion to further explore and document his proposal. An 'alternative' proposal was created by Sam, which recognised that this hierarchy was out of keeping with the move towards structuring the Incubator as a DAO.
Other admins have indicated above that they largely support the current thinking on restructuring. It is simply a question of implementing the changes. It was clearly agreed that the first, very simple step, was for the network proposal to be developed and submitted collectively.
It was with some frustration that I noted that Rion was unwilling to do this and, with some regret, I drew the conclusion that this was further and final evidence that he is essentially unwilling to accept the agreed upon devolution, and that this does not bode well for the Incubator's future: potentially allowing, as Sam suggests, for the irreversible self-appointment of a 'benevolent dictator' and permissioned, centralised decision taking.
I will make clear that I neither had any involvement in submitting a second network proposal (which has now been recognised as an unfortunate error), nor initially mooted the idea of a vote to replace Rion with Sam as the PO, but I have no doubt from witnessing some months of discussion and interaction from a relative distance, that the future of the Incubator is most likely to move in the envisaged de-centralised direction with Sam taking over this responsibility in the short term.
I am equally convinced that Rion will be able to make equally, if not more effective, contributions to the Incubator under the new structure, but I am afraid I feel obliged to declare that my honest belief is that it would ultimately damage the long term future of the Incubator if he were to continue to cling to this 'role', and therefore encourage all admins to vote 'YES' in this process.
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dashameter
New member
I can corroborate the accounts stated by Sam Kirby. The last months have been a huge distraction for incubator and have made it hard to focus on its core mission and to serve the network, because of Rion's constant push that having his name on the proposal is not just fulfilling the PO role entrusted to him by Andy Freer, but the "Network voting directly for his proposal" and that therefore he must attain total control of the incubator and single handedly control every admin and the incubator budget.
It would be a positive outcome for the incubator to have a yes vote on the PO transfer so we can finish the transition and implement the governance process that was already agreed upon and approved by everyone involved at the incubator.
For those unfamiliar with me I'm the longest active developer in incubator, built proof of concept apps to feed the lessons learned and requirements back to the platform team which influenced and shaped the ongoing development of the js-dash-sdk and implemented DIP14 256bit derivation in dashcore-lib (javascript), and fixed issues in DIP14 and DIP15 as part of my development work at incubator.
At Andy's request I developed a metamask style browser extension that can sign dapp interactions and that acts as a dashpay implementation in javascript. A public demo is pending testnet availability and the already implemented UI can be previewed in figma: https://www.figma.com/file/mPvvPFjLHn9kcCBgBkqh5S/DashPay-Wallet?node-id=1967:1797
It would be a positive outcome for the incubator to have a yes vote on the PO transfer so we can finish the transition and implement the governance process that was already agreed upon and approved by everyone involved at the incubator.
For those unfamiliar with me I'm the longest active developer in incubator, built proof of concept apps to feed the lessons learned and requirements back to the platform team which influenced and shaped the ongoing development of the js-dash-sdk and implemented DIP14 256bit derivation in dashcore-lib (javascript), and fixed issues in DIP14 and DIP15 as part of my development work at incubator.
At Andy's request I developed a metamask style browser extension that can sign dapp interactions and that acts as a dashpay implementation in javascript. A public demo is pending testnet availability and the already implemented UI can be previewed in figma: https://www.figma.com/file/mPvvPFjLHn9kcCBgBkqh5S/DashPay-Wallet?node-id=1967:1797
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rion
Active member
My interpretation? Terms I've added in?
The rule states:
The Proposal Owner can be replaced through a vote where >50% of Admins vote for a new Admin to be the PO
">50% of Admins" seems pretty clear to me. There are currently 11 admins. >50% = 6 admins required.
You want to make it ">50% of YES/NO voting Admins" so that only 5 admins are required now (different than your original post if I recall)
Who is adding words here?
qwizzie
Well-known member
Since the vote options include Recuse, the total number of admins required for quorum decision, should indeed include those admins that voted Recuse.
Those admins that voted Recuse may not have voted yes or no, but they voted nonetheless (the Recuse option).
Which means the admins required for quorum decision should be set to 6/11.
Unless the Dash Incubator rules somewhere specifically states that recused admins should not be counted for quorum decision.
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@AndyDark and others.
I vote No.
I agree with QuantumExplorer and Ivan, that we have not been highly involved in the operations of the Incubator (I've probably had the highest level of involvement). I do not have an opinion on the actual question of who should be the PO of the incubator, I do not as of this point know enough as to why Sam Kirby and the others would like to replace Rion.
However, I am not recusing my vote as Sam and Ivan are, primarily due to the interpretation of the rules being pushed by Andy. The rules are clear. "The Proposal Owner can be replaced through a vote where >50% of Admins vote for a new Admin to be the PO." There is no difference according to these rules between not voting and voting no. The rule only states that more than 50% must vote yes. My preferred opinion would be to not vote, as I am neither against or in favor of Rion staying the PO. However, this interpretation of the rules is forcing me to vote No. Again this vote is not stating that I am supporting or opposing Rion, but I am expressly opposing the interpretation of the rules that Andy has stated above under the clear language of the rules.
I vote No.
I agree with QuantumExplorer and Ivan, that we have not been highly involved in the operations of the Incubator (I've probably had the highest level of involvement). I do not have an opinion on the actual question of who should be the PO of the incubator, I do not as of this point know enough as to why Sam Kirby and the others would like to replace Rion.
However, I am not recusing my vote as Sam and Ivan are, primarily due to the interpretation of the rules being pushed by Andy. The rules are clear. "The Proposal Owner can be replaced through a vote where >50% of Admins vote for a new Admin to be the PO." There is no difference according to these rules between not voting and voting no. The rule only states that more than 50% must vote yes. My preferred opinion would be to not vote, as I am neither against or in favor of Rion staying the PO. However, this interpretation of the rules is forcing me to vote No. Again this vote is not stating that I am supporting or opposing Rion, but I am expressly opposing the interpretation of the rules that Andy has stated above under the clear language of the rules.
AndyDark
Well-known member
@rion @qwizzie - the Rules are saying more than half of Admins need to vote yes here obvs... but 2 of those admins are saying they have COI so shouldn't be part of that process - and that is the de facto state already in previous votes internally.
If now we don't allow them to recuse (meaning they can't eliminate themselves from eligibility to vote and effectively have to vote no) then of Admins who are prepared to vote, 6/9 are needed meaning in reality 66.6% of Admins eligible to vote need to vote yes to achieve the same goal as stated in the Rules.
Therefore to bring the vote closest to the intention of 50% stated in the Rules, I removed them from the tally.
If now we don't allow them to recuse (meaning they can't eliminate themselves from eligibility to vote and effectively have to vote no) then of Admins who are prepared to vote, 6/9 are needed meaning in reality 66.6% of Admins eligible to vote need to vote yes to achieve the same goal as stated in the Rules.
Therefore to bring the vote closest to the intention of 50% stated in the Rules, I removed them from the tally.
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AndyDark
Well-known member
Ok... if your in the bracket of Admins in question and you don't agree to the recusal then lets just take the literal interpretation.
@Pasta @QuantumExplorer @Ivan Shumkov so you guys are going to be tallied now. If you don't vote, that's effectively a "No" vote going forward, so if you're going to be an Admin, you're always impacting governance decisions effectively through action but also through inaction.