Dash Constitution - Request collaborative effort

[GrandMasterDash]

I can see votes for the DCG proposal "Decision Proposal: Change Proposal System" has magically surged from nowhere and, to be honest, I don't like how this is playing out, it seems very predictable. The proposal will pass, DCG will issue the code upgrade along side other "critical" updates, and most importantly, DCG will instigate a spork that will stop paying MNOs that don't upgrade i.e. enforcement by vote and spork. Let's be clear, voting and sporks are not, and should not be, the only mechanism for consensus. Ultimately, MNOs must retain the power to not update their node if it contains a consensus change they don't approve of. Sporks help to make hardforks a lot smoother but if a single organization is using them to impose code-is-law, then I suggest this should be regarded as centralized control, which also means DCG automatically accepts the legal liability that comes with it. As it stands, sporks are not governed or controlled by MNOs.

To remedy this, I would like to see MNOs come together and agree a constitution that is ratified as a proposal. This constitution would then be upheld by the Trust Protectors. Please post your ideas that protect the rights of dash stakeholders. I will start this off:

MNO and miners can not be coerced / penalized through a centralized mechanism such as sporks.

Also, a few years ago a proposal was passed that said all transactions must be less than 1 cent (USD). I think this too should be added to a constitution.

 

[AgnewPickens]

I am wondering how folks feel about delegating voting on some things like DIF supervisors and TPs to Dash Watch. Their voting platform was very hard to use and we made some big decisions with very low voter turnout.

 

[GrandMasterDash]

I am wondering how folks feel about delegating voting on some things like DIF supervisors and TPs to Dash Watch. Their voting platform was very hard to use and we made some big decisions with very low voter turnout.

Actually, what I think should happen is that we give all dash users the opportunity to vote, not on proposals but to vote for individual MNOs. Then we adjust the MNO voting power based on the community response. Give me 5x voting power if I do really well, or 5x less if I'm really bad. We enforce voting distribution by limiting voting to Dash Platform username holders. But I'm not sure this is a constitution thing, just my dream that we can directly engage with end users and drive up loyalty.

 

[stan.distortion]

Actually, what I think should happen is that we give all dash users the opportunity to vote, not on proposals but to vote for individual MNOs. Then we adjust the MNO voting power based on the community response. Give me 5x voting power if I do really well, or 5x less if I'm really bad. We enforce voting distribution by limiting voting to Dash Platform username holders. But I'm not sure this is a constitution thing, just my dream that we can directly engage with end users and drive up loyalty.

It makes a lot of sense but I'm not sure how well it would work in practice. Voter apathy is still our main problem with governance and its effects could potentially be much worse with a "one Dash, one vote" kind of mechanism. Aside from that concern it's a no-brainer imo, we absolutely need alternative governance mechanisms even if only for decisions where masternodes have a conflict of interest.

We seem to have a very serious problem at the mo, questions like this may just be the tip of the iceberg. Dash seems to be running more and more like a conventional business and that's not good, we've got killer advantages that are being frittered away.
This is just one example, we're perfectly positioned to use the wisdom of the crowd to improve governance and that potential is going to waste, it's not the way regular businesses work.
Open source creativity is another, we had a thriving community of geeks here on this forum and where are they now? Their discussions fell on deaf ears so they went elsewhere and it sure wasn't Discord, it doesn't happen in places where messages are gone and forgotten in a few days. That kind of work gets done on forums and it's certainly not happening on this one any more, we're hoping Platform will magically attract that talent and maybe it will but if it's not happening here then we're only realising a tiny fraction of the potential. Again, regular business doesn't work that way.
Our DAO... man, that's the giant killer of killer apps, DAO's will take over from the corporate model and we're the fxing first!! Will we be remembered?

 

[EUsouth]

Actually, what I think should happen is that we give all dash users the opportunity to vote, not on proposals but to vote for individual MNOs. Then we adjust the MNO voting power based on the community response. Give me 5x voting power if I do really well, or 5x less if I'm really bad. We enforce voting distribution by limiting voting to Dash Platform username holders. But I'm not sure this is a constitution thing, just my dream that we can directly engage with end users and drive up loyalty.

Channeling the voting power of all DASH holders is not to decentralize this governance exercise, but rather to try to take advantage of it for the benefit of an elite without, curiously, it losing its monopoly on monetary incentives. Of course, all the "solutions" of the Mnodes network that hijacks a supposedly decentralized project are inbred and refer to the framework of their elitist perk, so only patches can be expected. Bourgeois whales look for "servants" to vote on their behalf to save themselves any hassle or dedication ... and "modest" Mnodes look equally for "servants" to amplify their power of decision and to avoid their disadvantage ... exposing telltale symptoms of a totally unbalanced structure.

REAL decentralization is absolutely necessary for decisions to be made for the benefit of the ENTIRE ecosystem. If that is worthy of respect, as any collective structure should contemplate - and the DAO hijackers do not - "vote pools" backed by 1000 tokens can be structured through a simple "snapshot" in a specific time frame... and the micro-holders will be structured to define and deliver their vote to the network, who are already older and do not need Mnode daddys. Apart from this, any solution based on "second class members" will reduce participation incentives ... but admitting a right to vote that is shamefully denied today would already be a first step.

The tacit blockade, which is becoming more and more explicit, of the Shared Mnodes proposed years ago generates a centralized structure that not only defends its centralization, but also tends to hyper-concentration in a reductionist and wild "chair game". The Mnodes who own few devices will feel it more and more strongly, as microholders or miners have already suffered. And the "casting vote" of the microholders (the "users" is just another exercise in euphemism and marginalization) is THE ONLY one that, by pure practice, can only defend the general benefit of the ecosystem, since no particular aspiration towards its minority part would gain support ... and therefore, an impossible niche to despise in a project with decentralized aspirations ... which is not the current profile of DASH at all.

 

[jadewick]

MNOs should hold the ability to not refresh their hub in the event that it contains an agreement change they don't endorse of. Sporks help to make hardforks a great deal smoother