MNOs can vote on individual budget proposals but they can not approve or prevent fundamental changes to the code itself. Thus, it's perfectly possible that features may be modified or introduced against the will of MNOs.
It might be said that the marketplace decides through the buying or selling of dash / MNs, or the forking of code, but this is flawed thinking. It impllies, to keep the original code / functionality, a fork might be required. The forking of ethereum is the prime example of this i.e. the original chain and POW is on the fork, while the new chain and POS gets to use the existing ethereum userbase. That, to me, seems like a fundamental flaw.
So I was thinking, can we host the dash executables directly from the MNs and lock them on a self-adjusting multisig? For example, 3000 of 4000 MNs must approve any upgrade to the binaries. As MNs are added or subtracted, the multisig would be automatically destroyed / re-created.
It might be said that the marketplace decides through the buying or selling of dash / MNs, or the forking of code, but this is flawed thinking. It impllies, to keep the original code / functionality, a fork might be required. The forking of ethereum is the prime example of this i.e. the original chain and POW is on the fork, while the new chain and POS gets to use the existing ethereum userbase. That, to me, seems like a fundamental flaw.
So I was thinking, can we host the dash executables directly from the MNs and lock them on a self-adjusting multisig? For example, 3000 of 4000 MNs must approve any upgrade to the binaries. As MNs are added or subtracted, the multisig would be automatically destroyed / re-created.